ary 1969) that "we need our own Eastern culture. The very same which the Indians have preserved and the Japanese have safeguarded but which we have lost somewhere. In order to find it, we cannot cling to history. We have to reconstruct it." Quoted in Negin Nabavi, "The Discourse of 'Authentic Culture' in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s," in *Intellectual Trends in Twentieth-Century Iran: A Critical Survey* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 91–108.

66. These terms were highlighted by Khomeini but later used by other politicians, especially the third prime minister of the Islamic Republic, Mir Hussein Musavi. He was a trained architect and constantly used these words as he attempted to convince the government to contribute to housing for the poor. During his speech at the opening of an apartment complex for the poor in the city of Zanjan, he said: "The government should prioritize the building of houses for the *Kukh-neshinan*." See *Jomhuri Islami* 1117 (21 Farvardin 1362/March 1983): 16. For Khomeini's description of these two terms, see *Jomhuri Islami*, 1109 (Farvardin 1362/March 1983). Although in the long run these ideas were turned into mere ideological slogans that did little to help elevate the condition of peoples' lives, there is substantial evidence—some of which has already been explored by other scholars (especially Asef Bayat)—that the implementation of these ideas in the immediate aftermath of the revolution garnered great acclaim among the poor.

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7

Boundary Games

Ecochard, Doxiadis, and the Refugee Housing Projects under Military Rule in Pakistan, 1953–1959

■

M. IJLAL MUZAFFAR

ON May 20, 1963, some 150,000 residents of the newly built Korangi housing colony in Karachi sat outside their houses with their belongings, hoisting black flags to protest the eviction of one "Yusuf Bhutock" from his house by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA).[1] At any other location the protestors would have been dispersed with the baton if not the bulldozer. Korangi, however, had special status. It was built by the military government of Ayub Khan, the self-appointed field marshal and president of Pakistan from 1958 to1969, as a model housing project for refugees from India who had crowded the streets of Karachi since the partition of the subcontinent, and the end of British rule, in 1947 (figure 7.1). A clash with those refugee groups now would have delegitimized the project as well the government that had celebrated it. A confrontation would have also been a setback for the two American aid agencies, USAID and the Ford Foundation, that had sponsored the project as an experiment into social "pacification" designed to save Karachi's large migrant and refugee population from communist influence.

These concerns were not lost to the project's designer, the famous Greek architect-planner, and global consultant par excellence at the time, Constantine Doxiadis. In a letter to Colonel Nasser Humayune, the military director of the National Housing and Settlement Agency, and Harry Case, the Ford Foundation representative in Karachi, Doxiadis wrote:

> In the four and a half years of my acquaintance with the urban problems of Pakistan it is the first time that I have seen such an enthusiasm, inspiration and coordination of effort under a unique command for the achievement of a natural goal in this field. The



Figure 7.1. Ayub Khan, field marshall and president of Pakistan, Karachi, 1959. Touring the Korangi project during construction. *Source*: Ford Foundation Archives, New York.

> "Operation Korangi" as I think it should be called has all the characteristics of a beachhead started by commandos in hostile territory—by commandos who have the desire to achieve a national goal even by deciding to have greater sacrifices and casualties than normally. . . . Even more: it should be turned into the beachhead that is going to open the enemy land for conquest.[2]

Doxiadis's statement speaks to the founding claim of authoritarian rule in Pakistan: the framing of a heterogeneous polity as an enemy that must be fought in the present so that a unified nation could be preserved for the future. More important, it shows how this task is to be carried out: by casting modernization as a "natural goal" while framing all politics as unnatural hindrances that must be fought with unshakable resolve.[3] Described as "natural" process, modernization is imbued with an internal logic and unity. In contrast, politics is equated with the fragmentation of this unity. The unified logic of modernization is lost in the arena of political interruptions. Only the para-political and centralized authority of military rule can carry out the coordination demanded by the modernization process.

Projects of refugee settlement, like Korangi, were a critical component in consolidating this image. They constituted the representative face of the proclaimed coordinated enterprise: custodianship. The refugee formed the transitory figure that needed to be incrementally guided into modernity outside of the political arena. The Ayub government too had framed its rule in similar terms when it launched its "basic democracy" program. The program had banned all political parties with the claim that the public first needed to be trained for modern political participation under a centrally administered program of municipal elections. Continuity of administration superseded the interruptions of politics. This framing allowed the military government to forge an alliance with Pakistan's influential civil bureaucracy, extending the latter's powers and giving the military government a civil face.[4] The basic democracy program projected the transitory status of the refugee onto the entire country, turning the entire national population as refugees into democratic politics.

What, however, set this mode of authoritarian power apart was its construction around the idea of transition. Despite the emphasis on centralized authority, that authority is presented as a transitory custodianship of a figure, a nation in transition, who despite its present derailment into political contestations, possesses the key to modernization. Presenting itself as an emancipatory custodian of a transitory figure, the military government was able to have its cake and eat it too. Architecture and planning served as apt tools to tread the line between authority and custodianship, between centralized power and its often disseminated application. But before we look at the process of refugee settlement, its different framings, and their currency in securing authoritarian rule in Pakistan, let us first consider the historical context that had made refugee settlement such a potent issue in the post-partition national political discourse.

Partition

The partition of India and Pakistan had been both unpredictable and violent, displacing more than twelve million people and leaving over a million dead. One major factor of this toll had been the ensuing unpredictability of the partition itself, concerning not only whether the subcontinent would be divided into a Hindu majority India and Muslim majority Pakistan but also regarding where the exact boundaries of the new nation-states would fall.[5] The struggle for independence had produced entrenched divisions between the two major political parties, the Muslim League and the Congress. The political impasse over the sharing of power had led the Muslim League to present a demand for a separate Muslim homeland, Pakistan, in the Muslim majority areas of the subcontinent. The difficulty and costs, both material and human, of such a division in a heterogeneous population was evident to leaders on both sides. Because of these challenges, the status of Pakistan—whether it was to be a confederated set of provinces within a united India or a separate nation-state—remained undeter-

mined. Initially, the British were open to the resolution of political differences before independence, a path particularly stressed by the second to last viceroy, Archibald Wavell.

The Second World War, however, changed the British posture in India. Marred by the political and financial cost of the war, the British government wanted an expedient decolonization with minimum political costs. Using the political impasse as an opportunity, the postwar British government of Clement Attlee pressed for a quick resolution, sending in a new viceroy, Louis Mountbatten (Lord Mountbatten of Burma), with the explicit mission of quickly untangling British involvement with the deteriorating political situation in India. Mountbatten dismissed the long time line proposed by his predecessor, Wavell, and appointed a Boundary Commission led by a London lawyer, Cyril Radcliff. The commission was to provisionally divide the contested states on "notional division" and then hold appeals from different sides claiming majority in particular areas.[6]

This process, bounded by the commission's deadline to give its deliberations, created a crisis. The demands for separation, which were initially used for political maneuvering and for building popular support, became occasions for staging communal riots, giving legitimacy to the haste for decolonization created by the British. Each push for demarcation, in areas with heterogeneous populations, betrayed its impossibility. Till the last tick of the clock to independence, the exact boundaries of the partition remained unresolved. Even though independence was declared on the preannounced deadline, the question of partition lingered on. The status of cities like Amritsar and Lahore, the traditional capital of the state of the Punjab, which had near equal Muslim and Hindu populations, remained unclear. Major population groups held onto their properties in hope. Rulers of many princely states were given the choice to decide their own fate. This created further confrontations between populations in those areas.

When the Radcliff commission finally produced its adhoc report, the results were astonishingly disastrous. Finding themselves on the wrong side of the border, countless people were turned into refugees in their own homes. Massive population movements were combined with widespread massacres. Trainloads of dead arrived on both sides. Villages perished and burned, the dead disappeared into mass graves. More than a million people lost their lives. These dislocations would come to be best remembered in the postwar political culture on both sides of the border through the photographs of Margaret Bourke-White, the famous American photojournalist known for her uncanny ability to be present before unfolding catastrophes. She had been present at the allied liberation of the Buchenwald concentration camp in Germany in 1945; she had taken the famous image of Gandhi at the spinning wheel hours before his assassination; and she was now present in India before the partition.

In Bourke-White's images of the partition, one characteristic stands out: the juxtaposition of opposing scales, the grand and the immediate, the national and the personal (figures 7.2 and 7.3). Distraught faces are set against grand vistas, blank skies, and historical sites. It is as if the partition had opened a chasm that had swallowed all that mediated between the personal and the national, bringing the former into grating adjacency with the latter without the intervening layers of the social, the common, the familial, and the familiar. Bourke-White stressed this forced coupling by highlighting the overburdened and inadequate means of transportation, infrastructure, or simply the makeshift objects that are employed to make the historical crossing. The inadequacy of the means at the individuals' disposal, to meet this historic and spatial challenge, gives the images an air of incertitude. The refugees appear to us to not only be passing through a catastrophic transition but also as if they would forever remain caught in this moment.

And indeed they would. This transitory status would continue to define the idea of the refugees in national political discourse even when they had reached their destinations. Arguably, the popularity of Bourke-White's images in national politics stems from their ability to resonate the perceived uncertainty of space/time/identity that the partition ushered, an uncertainly that still continues to inhabit the contested border between India and Pakistan, making it one of the most monitored boundaries in the world.[7]

Figure 7.2. Margaret Bourke-White, *Partition of India*, 1947. *Source*: Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images. © Time Life Pictures.



Figure 7.3. Margaret Bourke-White, *Partition of India*, 1947. *Source*: Time & Life Pictures/ Getty Images. © Time Life Pictures.

In Pakistan the figure representing the qualities memorialized by the partition would be the refugee in Karachi. Even though the most intense violence and majority of migration occurred across the border in the Punjab—the divided province to the North—those who migrated there were not considered refugees for long in the political discourse. This perception was molded by the fact that displaced Punjabis still had a "homeland" left in the Pakistani half of the Punjab. The same held true for other ethnic and linguistic groups, such as Pathans in the North West and Sindhis in the South, who were seen to belong to the linguistic majorities in the other three provinces of West Pakistan. The refugees in Karachi, however, had migrated from Urdu-speaking urban areas in India and had no corresponding Urdu-speaking province in Pakistan. Most of them were settled in Karachi, the first capital of Pakistan. They soon acquired the curious status of permanent refugees within the country.[8] This framing was taken on by the refugees themselves to claim a separate political identity. Yet it was also projected onto them by others seeking national leadership, particularly the federal government. Because the refugees did not belong to any of the national provincial majorities, the question of their settlement could be taken up to claim impartiality and nonpartisanship.[9]

The refugee in Karachi represented an impartial and transitory subject. Because she appeared outside of national politics, she rendered the politics of associations and alliances transparent. Her future represented the nation's future. If Bourke-White's images depicted the uncertainty that haunted the refugees during the course of their journey, the projects of their settlement betrayed the political currency this uncertainty held after the refugees reached their supposed destinations. Settlement was no longer a question of providing shelter but of transforming the refugees—and through them the nation itself. The refugee became the future national subject, and refugee settlement, the representative project of national modernization.

As the Korangi project would make evident, the Ayub government also deployed the project of refugee settlement to justify its rule. It framed refugee settlement in Karachi as part of a carefully guided process of national modernization that demanded long-term administrative custodianship rather than political representation. The legitimacy of the Ayub government's leadership hung in this coupling between settlement and modernization. It existed as long as this connection was perpetuated, as long as the project of refugee settlement was incomplete, as long as the refugee (and the nation) was depicted in the process of perpetual settlement. Doxiadis had judged these larger political requirements correctly, describing his designs from the beginning as experimental "processes" rather than concrete plans.[10] Each proposal emphasized the systemic coordination of parts, centralized administrative control, and incremental growth. This approach won him several projects from the Ayub government, including the commissions for a new campus for the University of Punjab and, in 1962, for the new capital of Pakistan, Islamabad.[11]

Ecochard

Korangi, however, was not the first attempt at setting in place a process of refugee settlement in Karachi. Although he was prominent, Doxiadis was a latecomer on this scene. It was Michel Ecochard, the director of town planning of the French protectorate in Morocco, who was first invited to propose a solution for settling refugees in Karachi in 1953. Together with George Candilis, Shadrach Woods, and Vladimir Bodiansky—the other members of Atbat Afrique, the African offshoot of CIAM (Congres International de Modern)—Ecochard had recently designed massive housing projects for different migrant populations around Casablanca.[12] The projects were highly praised at CIAM's meeting in Aix-en-Provence, the first after the war, as a new culturally specific form of modernism. In his report to the United Nations and the Pakistani government, Ecochard himself presented the projects as suitable precedents for Karachi's refugee situation.[13] Despite its apparent suitability, however, Ecochard's project for Karachi was not realized, unable to take hold in the turbulent

political climate of Pakistan. Yet this failure highlights, just as importantly as Doxiadis's later proposal, the viability of different models of intervention and change in relation to particular structures of the postcolonial state.

Ecochard had arrived in Karachi as a consultant for the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UN-TAA) on the recommendation of Ernest Weissman, an active CIAM member and the head of the Housing and Planning Section at the UN headquarters in New York.[14] Weissman's recommendation proved timely for Ecochard. Even though the Casablanca projects were highly praised in CIAM circles for their cultural "sensitivity," they had received severe criticism in Morocco and France for being just the opposite: overly "functionalist" and not sensitive enough to the "cultural requirements" of the native Muslim populations. When Morocco gained independence in 1954, this criticism became Ecochard's Achilles heal, ousting him to Paris when many colonial administrators remained behind. The Karachi project gave the Casablanca schemes a new lease on life, providing an opportunity to maintain the status they had acquired in modern architectural debates.

These differing perceptions of the Casablanca projects in different circles stem from Ecochard's own framing of culture and function as interrelated yet distinct spheres. Following the conventions of colonial anthropology, Atbat had classified the city's migrant population according to different cultural and religious profiles. Their varying characteristics, however, were seen to be transformable under proper regulation, eventually fitting into a normative model of modern nuclear family that was to constitute the building block of the extended French imperial realm. This process of transformation, however, was to happen incrementally, with cultural habits of the native subjects modified periodically, without causing, as it were, a sudden "break" in their cultural "patterns."

Ecochard's and Atbat's schemes sought to attain this goal by slowly moving the native population through different "functional" arrangements representing different population densities—from high-density lowrises reminiscent of native living arrangements to low-density modern highrises. The Casablanca housing blocks, so appreciated at the CIAM conferences, represented different architectural containers in which functional calculations periodically maintained and transformed perceived cultural practices. Culture, in this mode of intervention, becomes an alibi for a particular model of administrative control that appears indirect and distant but is ever present and all encompassing.

The dual focus on culture and function as categories of design is often taken as a sign of contradictory sympathies of the designers by many historians in their evaluation of Ecochard and Atbat's work. But this is not, as Monique Eleb would have it, a sign of an ethically torn, "schizophrenic" mind-set of a colonial administrator, unable to decide what is more important, colonial science or native culture.[15] Schizophrenia was precisely the mode of administration under

"inclusive" French colonialism. Modernity was presented as a project of only periodically calibrating the movements of a loosely defined, varied, and dispersed cultural sphere of the French imperial domain. Perpetuated in the name of protecting native populations from sudden influence of modernization, this dual approach allowed colonial administrators to take both a preservationist and transformative stance, emphasizing the dimension demanded by the circumstances: preservationist if labor reserves were required, transformative if displacement was warranted. The dialectic of culture and function seen in play in the Casablanca housing projects reflects this dual strategy of imperial administration.

For Ecochard the logic of incremental organization employed in Casablanca was apt for the problem of refugees in Pakistan as well. Pakistan too needed a model of cultural custodianship built on a system of administrative management, one that was distant yet ever present, inclusive yet centralized. This model had allowed the colonial government to maintain low investment in public welfare in the name of preserving existing cultural practices. It now allowed a third world government to maintain political and administrative control in the face of limited available resources, to fill the gap between what the government could provide and what it must plan to retain political legitimacy.

Ecochard's initial proposal for Karachi constituted of a series of independent satellite "cities" at Landhi, a site adjacent to Doxiadis's future Korangi project.[16] These cities were to be developed over time, along the main railway line that linked Karachi to the outlying industrial areas. This multiple-city approach, however, quickly changed to a more centralized design, composed of a single large city with multiple subunits, or "neighborhoods" (figure 7.4). Although each of these units were to have a fixed periphery—and a fixed "framework" of roads, shopping centers dispensaries, schools, and gardens—they were meant to accommodate changing types and arrangements of housing. The commercial and community areas were to be located at the intersection of multiple housing sectors, leaving minimal restrictions for different possible organization of houses in large swaths of open green.

What's curious here is that Ecochard does not settle on a particular organization scheme for the houses until the very end (figure 7.5). In fact, the possibility of ever-new reorganization is presented as the main feature of the plan. Following Casablanca, Ecochard expected the new city to grow from provisionary shelter to an intermediary stage of "hutments"—that could be arranged and rearranged in different conglomerations within open green space—to other housing types (medium- to high-rise blocks). As the economic and social profile of the inhabitants changed over time, Ecochard argued, the entire settlement would move toward lower densities and more open space.

The city plan is here composed as an infrastructural field that forms both


(fig 16) Scheme showing how it is possible to change the proposed neighbourhood limit
The framework remains the same with its roads, shopping centres, dispensary, school and garden. Some roads are added -

Figure 7.4. Michel Ecochard, Landhi, Karachi, 1953–1954. Site plan of the revised proposal of a single "city" with a "neighborhood" detail showing housing organization possibilities within open space. *Source*: United Nations Archives, New York.


Provisory shelter
ground floor houses
Multy storey and terrace houses
fig 2) Evolutive principles of the proposed city
The 3 stages possible according to the rise of the standard of living, but always with the same framework

Figure 7.5. Michel Ecochard, Landhi, Karachi, 1953–1954. "Evolutive principles" for refugee housing. *Source*: United Nations Archives, New York.

the condition of transformation of the houses and their telos, the moment when transforming environment would catch up with the full potential of the framework. The scheme outlines a process of evolution whose final form is already visible. The inhabitants are caught simply in the process of filling in the details.[17] This approach points to Ecochard's background as an archeologist. A graduate of Ecole des Beaux Arts, Ecochard had begun his career working on the restoration of historical buildings in Damascus.[18] There, Ecochard began to formulate a continuity between archeology and planning. For Ecochard, his archeological projects were in fact planning exercises that gave old structures new functions. Working on a restoration of the Azem Palace in Damascus—a project that would lead to the commission for a master plan for Damascus itself—Ecochard asserted that an archeological project "[was] an experiment . . . to bring back to life a building both through visual stimulation and through use of the plan."[19] The plan therefore did not simply authenticate a past and restore a supposed original function to a building; rather, the plan set an experimental path within a new set of forces.

A certain parallel can be established between Ecochard's training as an archeologist and his design approach in Karachi. Ecochard imagined the process of establishing the presence of the state in Karachi as itself an archeological project, only it was an archeology in reverse. Instead of uncovering sedimented layers of the past, the Karachi plan built up the future as sedimented layers of the present. Planning as archeology began like an archeological project with making visible the contours of the site whose contents were yet unknown. In time, planning added new layers to articulate the potential promised by the site. Yet, similar to an archeological exploration, each layer required dismantling the last to dig deeper. The future was to be constructed by a continuous process of dismantling and reassembling. The open green areas surrounding the buildings represented the space of this calibrated transformation.

At Korangi this process came to be articulated in the language of CIAM's famous four functions of "circulation," "work," "living," and "public facilities"—the last modified here as "the care of body and spirit" to include a *jama masjid* (community mosque) and a hospital in the national context (figure 7.6). The four functions announced in advance the profile of modern life whose particular form was to be discovered in time. The city is literally imagined as a palimpsest of these different functional layers, each influencing and nudging the process of culture change toward incremental modernization. Culture is the stuff that happened between the functional layers, incrementally transformed by their dismantling and reassembling in accordance with the requirements and values of modern life.

The houses in Karachi then become spatial frameworks that transform the inhabitants as they traverse the modernization process. The project provided



Figure 7.6a. Michel Ecochard, Landhi, Karachi, 1953–1954. Final proposal for the first city showing "circulation," "living," "working," and "body and spirit." *Source:* United Nations Archives, New York.



Figure 7.6 b

Figure 7.6 c



Figure 7.6 d

the comprehensive frame within which these transformations took place. Ecochard extended this logic to map the entire city of Karachi, mapping its density as indicative of different stages of modernization of the inhabitants and how they could be set on path to the next stage under the guidance of a comprehensive and visible administrative framework. By setting up a framework for what is not yet there, and may never be, Ecochard's proposal addressed the dilemma faced by the postcolonial state: the difference between the promise and the plan, between what the state can provide and what it must claim to provide to ward off political challenges. Yet Ecochard's approach could not find the same currency in Pakistan as it had in colonial Casablanca. As Paul Rabinow has argued, even in the colonial context of Morocco, the central government did not constitute a homogeneous power.[20] The comprehensive framework of inclusive imperialism was always open to contestations from within. The idea of unified imperial power was primarily advanced by the different elements in the government to justify their positions.

Ecochard assumed that just as it had done in Casablanca, the emphasis on the presence of a comprehensive armature of a central power could serve equally well in negotiating the contestations of governance in the national context of Pakistan. In Pakistan, however, the idea of central government had never acquired the historical and ideological weight that different parties could invoke to advance their agendas. A design emphasizing the need for a comprehensive and visible armature of organization, however open, produced the opposite effect, making the very power attained through such a strategy open to attack. In a protracted exchange, Ecochard kept accusing the Refugee Settlement Agency of ignoring the comprehensive nature of the plan and picking and choosing individual parts for piecemeal implementation. Soon the project came to be framed in the political debate as an idealized scheme beyond the means of a developing nation and disconnected from local concerns and politics.

Doxiadis

The most striking difference between Doxiadis's and Ecochard's plans is their different approach to boundaries. Ecochard had placed particular emphasis on delineating clear boundaries for his proposed refugee settlements. The proposal by Doxiadis's firm, Doxiadis and Associates (DA), however, purported to an idea of continuous expansion. DA's proposed settlement was to grow linearly over time out of its present site and direct the growth of the entire city of Karachi (figure 7.7). This approach reflected a different idea of consolidating state power than the one proposed by Ecochard.

In setting a predefined scale for the entire project, Ecochard designated the state as the ultimate agent of change. The open interior of the refugee city,



Figure 7.7. Doxiadis Associates, Korangi, Karachi, 1959. Presumed direction of growth (from left to right) connecting other areas of the city. *Source*: Ford Foundation Archives, New York.

enclosed within predefined boundaries, proclaimed all possibilities of change in advance. Indeed, the process of change could take many paths, as Ecochard's multiple housing arrangements made apparent. But all these possibilities were outlined by the state (all houses were to be allocated on a transitory basis). The state designated the end as well as the multiple paths that reached that end. In contrast, Doxiadis's approach, in eradicating the fixed boundaries of the plan, worked toward erasing precisely the scale at which the state made itself visible as the agent of social reform. In Doxiadis's plan, the inhabitant herself is proclaimed as the agent of change. The state's role is deliberately projected to the background, limited to providing only the administrative framework for the inhabitant's self-mobilized emergence into modernity.

Doxiadis's scheme proposed a nestled model of social organization controlled by a disseminated administrative structure, without an identifiable authority (figure 7.8). The population was to be divided into different "community sectors," beginning with the basic unit of "community class I," which included ten to twenty households of similar income levels. Three to seven of such communities grouped together formed the next administrative level of "class



Figure 7.8. Doxiadis Associates, Korangi master plan, 1959. *Source*: Ford Foundation Archives, New York.

II." When an elementary school was added to a grouping of class II, it formed a community of "class III." Each class III community was supposed to be economically uniform, but they could differ in their income level relative to each other. A grouping of different income level class III communities plus a mosque, a teahouse, market, shops, and a cinema, formed a class IV community. Class IV communities were in turn combined to form class V, which formed the basic "community sector" of the Korangi plan.[21]

Even though the structure was hierarchically organized, in Doxiadis's estimation the purpose of this organization was to serve as a basis for "consolidating," and not "centralizing," the structure of public administration.[22] Korangi was to be built through the cooperation of both public and private enterprise. Various private industries pooled together their resources and formed cooperative bodies. These cooperatives were part of the Korangi's board of management and were to fund Korangi's housing sectors according to the needs of their surrounding industries. As a 1959 Doxiadis and Associates progress report on Korangi showed, of the ensemble of housing sectors and community center in the entire settlement, the government was only to build the lowest income housing sectors, and even those only partially. The rest, including major parts of the community centers, including the community mosque, were to be

built by providing "incentives" to the private sector at the right moment in the development of the scheme.

Doxiadis hailed his scheme as a structure of "coordinating" public and private interests, a coordination that remained disseminated and largely transparent, providing opportunities of self-mobilization for the inhabitant themselves. Yet "coordination" here serves as a euphemism for managing a certain risk for the government and its allied "private interests." Korangi provided massive labor housing for the surrounding industries. In the past, if the government or the industry provided direct housing to the workers on mortgage, they, instead of paying down the debt, held the debt as employment security.[23] Korangi's nestled spatial organization and administrative structure of coordinated and disseminated authority made it nearly impossible to challenge any policy on a limited scale, while making coordinated evictions expedient. As the city grew, so did the network of mutually dependent spatial relationships and the disseminated administrative structure. The nestled space made the centralized authority of the military government and its allied private interests appear as distant managers of a self-mobilized modernization process, making them both ever present and unidentifiable. What might appear as a contradiction—the dual focus on centralized authority and disseminated application of power—actually formed the very mode through which power was preserved. Such contradictions didn't undo power but made its stable exercise possible.

The dissemination of state authority is premised on the framing of the refugee as a subject in transition between tradition and modernity. Although seen to be dislocated in the modern national landscape, she is not simply claimed as a subject in need of rigid control. Rather, she is presented as subject who possesses the potential of modernization herself. The state simply serves to emancipate this potential. The more the state is able to serve this role from afar, the less it is susceptible to constrain the refugee's capacity to constitute a seamless link between tradition and modernity.

Doxiadis is often accused of abstracting traditional architectural elements—such as the courtyard or windscreens—into standardized elements, rearranged onto grids for logistical convenience, in a way that they lose their social even climatic purpose. Indeed, that was the case in Korangi as well (figure 7.9). As it had previously done in Iraq, Doxiadis and Associates placed the courtyards on the side or in the back of the houses. In its new place the courtyard no longer appears to provide cool air to the surrounding rooms or form a multipurpose social space supposedly shared across gender and age. The courtyard in DA designs only appears to provide space for storage, livestock, or future expansion of the house.

Yet the spatial and symbolic criticism in focusing on what is missed in this ab-



Figure 7.9. Doxiadis Associates, Korangi, Karachi, 1959. Housing plans for different income groups, to be expanded through individual incentive.
Source: Ford Foundation Archives, New York.

stracting enterprise misses what these abstractions actually do: present culture as a self-regulating and transforming sphere. In Doxiadis's proposals culture is always being transformed by individual agents to bridge the gap between tradition and modernity; it is always already an image of a self-regulating market. For Ecochard, culture also constituted an intervening layer between tradition and modernity. But it was a layer that did not inhere any agency of change itself. It was necessary to preserve culture so as not to expose the native populations too quickly to modern life. Layers of culture were to be dismantled and reassembled by the colonial and the nation-state over time to ensure that all cultural identities slowly transformed toward greater integration and modernization. For Doxiadis, state did not need to claim this role. It was only a custodian of culture that itself bore the potential of modernization as long as it was not hijacked by political contestations. Culture too, like modernization, possessed a self-regulating internal unity and logic that, given the right circumstances, complemented (not opposed) modernization. Moving the courtyard to the side of the house provided precisely such an opportunity of unleashing the potential of modernization within the cultural sphere. The courtyard could now be recognized by the cultural agent herself as an opportunity for expanding the house or for providing storage for a small home-run business.

The houses at Korangi, nestled in the ever-expanding grid, reflected the narrative of culturally driven entry into the market economy. The grid of streets established individual property lots and a permanent structure of ownership. The houses too were based on a uniform grid system. This allowed the minimum inhabitable house provided by the state to differ in size for different "classes" of inhabitants, while maintaining the lot size to be more or less the same (see figure 7.9). This uniformity, Doxiadis argued, provided the poor classes with more potential of investment in the house in the future. The empty portion of the lot thus served, Doxiadis asserted, as a credit-building device as well as a basis for establishing demand for the building industry. As individual owners combined modern living habits with their cultural mores, they expanded their houses and built credit, generating further economic activity, extending both the linearly growing commercial center and housing sectors. The houses allowed the individuals to enter the market economy as cultural agents of change, incrementally making their own choices that tied them in a unique manner to the modern industrial and financial systems. For Doxiadis, this individuated, culturally driven entry celebrated the unique standing of the third world in the globalizing world. Its cultural agents enriched the global market economy, preventing it from taking the form of mind-numbing uniformity that characterized Western modernization.

This view stemmed from Doxiadis's understanding of culture as an organic-biological force, not a process of sedimentation of certain values and practices

over time, as Ecochard had imagined. Culture followed the dynamic, shifting, and sometimes aggressive logic of biological evolution. Human settlements were the continuous trace left behind by this force whose operative principles were otherwise hidden from view. Doxiadis kept referring to cities as bodies with arteries, heart, lungs, and nerves that grew with the multiplication of cells. The basic units of this multiplication process were cells called "shells," an elementary cultural unit, filled with multifarious potentials that were tested out against other shells in the wider field of the social realm. New ideas emerged from a shell and came into contact with others outside it. Over time, the destructive ideas were eliminated and productive ones were strengthened, shaping the contours of the larger society.

But this evolutionary process entailed immense waste. Cultural evolution sometimes followed dead and destructive ends. These potentials could be guided, Doxiadis asserted, if we understood and shaped the urbanizing environments in terms of particular programmatic dimensions of "man," "nature," "society," "shells," and "networks" (figure 7.10). These broadly conceived spatial categories could be used to provide cultural force fields across the world with certain developmental pathways. This managerial approach was to be called "Ekistics, the science of human settlements" and was given a home in the 1950s at the Athens Technological Institute. There has been considerable critical attention paid to Doxiadis's programmatic categories, particularly his idea of net-

Figure 7.10. Constantine Doxiadis, holding the 3-D model of Ekistics with spheres representing its basic elements of "man," "society," "shell," "nature," and "networks." Each element is connected to the other four. *Source*: Doxiadis Archives, Benaki Museum, Athens, Greece.

work as a category that not only held its own independent sphere but was also connected to and embedded in all the other categories. This critique, however, has ignored the nature of the space implied *between* the network lines. This is the space of culture, triangulated within the connecting rods of Doxiadis's three-dimensional model of Ekistics.

For Doxiadis the essential quality of culture in the non-Western world was its transitory status. Suddenly brought to the world stage through rapid decolonization and modern communication, culture in this sphere was susceptible to lose its self-correcting qualities and be suppressed in the haste for modernization. In this view Doxiadis could be seen to be in line with other conservative theorists of development that saw the postwar era as being ridden with conflicts of mutually exclusive forces. What sets Doxiadis apart, however, is that instead of seeing this duality as hindrance to modernization, he saw it as providing a particular advantage for developing countries in the networked world of the future.

Transition was the moment when cultural differences and similarities became unhinged and lost their meaning as absolutes. The cultures in transition provided a solution—on the one hand, to the ever-present threat of exaggerated difference that led to global conflicts such as the World Wars, and on the other hand, from the haunting prospect of global homogenization and boredom. Cultures in transition held the potential of both preserving difference while encouraging integration. The goal of development then was not to resolve transition as quickly as possible but to highlight and prolong it. Seen this way, cultures in transition were not only the terrains on which the network lines were to be stretched; they were also the spaces that collectively formed the condition of a stable networked world.[24]

The refugee as a figure in transition was the prototype subject for the project of global integration. Yet this framing also allowed for the sleight of hand that made Doxiadis's proposal so desirable to authoritarian regimes and their sponsors around the world. The transitory subject also provided an alibi for a system of perpetual management, of continuous design and infinite transition. We see this dimension valued in the idea of custodianship sketched out by the Ayub government, a custodianship that wanted to usher in market economics but withhold the supposedly accompanying process of political participation. A particular idea of the pre-political consumer is constructed in the Ekistical world, one who is available for adventures in the market but is declared unsuitable for those in politics. This consumer can best understand the language of culture and for this reason warrants political management. Culture becomes an alibi for pushing entry into the market while delaying entry into politics. The subject becomes the generator of demands but not a patron of democratic politics.

The argument for the cultural entry into modernity presented in the design of the houses at Korangi leaves out the fact that individuated change, when cast primarily in the language of culture, also ensures that the cultural subject forever remained caught in his or her transitory stage. Refugee is a figure that can host the idea of delay in political representation. Both seen as being out of sync with the action in the national political theater and valorized for it, he or she can perpetually celebrate the idea of soft modernization cast in the language of culture.

Returning to Doxiadis's militaristic statement in the aftermath of the Korangi protest, we can now discern another dimension of the curious framing of the public as a certain enemy: in Pakistan, as would be the case in many military postcolonial states seeking U.S. alignment, the shifting status of the public from friend to enemy was a function of scale, not of category. It is the individual that is the subject of urbanism and development while the social is equated with socialist politics. In Doxiadis's proposed program, the object of state intervention is no longer the social but the individual. From the very onset, Korangi is imagined as a project that could prevent the socialization of refugees as a political group.

Doxiadis and the Ayub government did not consider, however, that such delaying strategies could not be continually masked with architecture. As the Korangi protest showed, the very sites of supposed transition could just as easily be turned into sites of social organization, reframing the system of perpetual transition as one of perpetual crisis. It would take almost another decade, a tainted election, and an economic crisis for the political opposition to mobilize the mass protests that would eventually unseat Ayub Khan. Yet the inherent political crisis of Pakistan stemming from the attempts to keep ethnic and linguistic divisions in check through centralized control would continue to resurface. Ayub handed over power to a transitory military government that promised to hold immediate elections. The election, however, resulted in conflicting claims to power that led to the separation of East Pakistan from the western part in 1971.[25] It was not long before the national and international fault lines that brought Ayub into power created another opening for a military coup. In 1977 the socialist civilian government was disposed by a U.S.-leaning military dictatorship just when the Soviet Union began to increase its influence in neighboring Afghanistan.[26]

What is critical to note in these reiterating crises of power is the manner in which the international and the national embed themselves within each other to advance their agendas, rather than imposing them independently. Indeed, power is secured abruptly. Yet its maintenance requires continuous tactical maneuvers. In this realm development is repeatedly advanced as a problem of coordination of different cultural forces by both national and international

forces. Architecture is claimed as the behavioral turf on which this coordination takes place. Development is often simply seen as a form of neoimperialism imposed from the outside. An external power imposes its will on a subjugated society. This model of oppressor-oppressed does not adequately explain the mutually legitimizing modes of power in the development arena, just as it does not explain the complexities of colonial governance. It is here that architectural and urban projects, such as Doxiadis's and Ecochard's, provide critical archives for understanding the new and emerging modes of intervention. It is here that they also betray a history of modern architecture's intimate relationship with structures of power in the postwar international arena.

Notes

1. See "K. D. A. Ejectment Drive Cut Short," *Dawn*, May 21, 1963.

2. Constantine Doxiadis, "On the problem of rehabilitation of displaced persons and urban development of Pakistan," undated letter, Ford Foundation Archives, New York.

3. Doxiadis, undated letter; reports for Korangi's progress over the years had carried the title "a project for cultural evolution of a nation." This title was also adopted as the key phrase of President Ayub's speech at the project's inauguration.

4. For a detail discussion of the Ayub government's "basic democracy" program, see Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

5. For a detailed account of the unpredictability surrounding the partition, see Hassan Amtul, *Impact of Partition*, RCSS Policy Studies 37 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2006).

6. For a detailed account of the "Radcliff line," see Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

7. This continued perception of Bourke-White's photographs as representative images of the partition's uncertainty is evident in their appearance on the cover of many recent studies of the partition. See, for example, see Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); and Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

8. This dislocation of the "Urdu-speaking" population indeed was a curious phenomenon, pointing not so much to the marginalization of a minority but to uncertainty surrounding the status of the central government itself in a politically heterogeneous landscape. Urdu was declared by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League and Pakistan's first governor general, as the national language because it did not belong to, and hence favor, any of the country's four provinces. But because of this para-provincial status, the language also operated as a mark of marginalization.

9. For a discussion of the politicization of the refugee question in different international context, including South Asia, see Smita Tewari Jassal and Eyal Ben-Ari, eds., *The Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007).

10. Doxiadis had first presented his firm's planning approach as an open-ended experiment in his proposals for Iraq. Between 1955 and 1958, Doxiadis had proposed a large-scale national planning program for then contested monarchical government in the country. The

program was carried out with the help of U.S. aid agencies as part of the Cold War foreign policy of "containment" of communist influence. Although Doxiadis's ambitious plan was left incomplete when Iraq's monarchical government was overthrown in 1958, it presented for Pakistan's Ayub government, which was also supported by United States under the containment policy, a viable model for managing the refugee question. For Doxiadis and Associates' designs for Iraq, see Panayiota Pyla, "Rebuilding Iraq, 1955–58: Modernist Housing, National Aspirations, and Global Ambitions," *International Working-Party for Documentation and Conservation of Buildings, Sites, and Neighbourhoods of the Modern Movement* 35 (2006): 71–77.

11. The securing of Islamabad project presented a major validation of Doxiadis and Associates' agendas and approach. Doxiadis publicized the commission heavily in modern architectural circles and publications and media, including dedicating a special issue of *Ekistics* on it. Also see Doxiadis's interview with Deena Clark on NBC's "A Moment with" on March 1, 1968, which focuses on Islamabad as a global solution to the crisis of an urbanizing world, available online at (Part 1) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSQWS9WcCQs; (Part 2) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKvY6iRirJs&feature=related; and (Part 3) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvstRTw2aaU&feature=related.

12. For a detailed history of Atbat Afrique and its projects in Morocco, see Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb, *Casablanca: Colonial Myths and Architectural Ventures* (New York: Monacelli Press, 2002). Also see Jean-Louis Cohen's "Architectural History and the Colonial Question: Casablanca, Algiers, and Beyond," *Architectural History* 49 (2006): 349–68; "The Whiteness of the Surf: Casablanca," *Any* 16 (1996): 16–19; and "The Moroccan Group and the Theme of Habitat," *Rassegna* 52, no. 4 (December 1992): 58–67.

13. "These proposals [for Karachi]," Ecochard argued in Pakistan, "are not theoretical; these principles have been applied on a very large scale in another country [Morocco]." Michel Ecochard, "The Problem of Refugees in Karachi, First and Second Reports," 1953, United Nations Archives, New York.

14. As a UN consultant, Ecochard's contract was much shorter (six months) than Doxiadis's protracted engagement that not only produced initial plans and reports for the project but also consultancy services for the scheme's construction as well as for setting up parallel research and education institutions. Yet the two modes—the long-term and the short-term—work as complementary vectors, each creating the space and legitimacy for the other. This fact is made evident by the change in Ecochard's position, when he stayed on in Pakistan on several private and government projects after the Landhi project was cancelled. Two large commissions secured by Ecochard from his stay in Pakistan were the projects of Karachi University campus and the museum at the ruins of the 2600 B.C. settlement Muhenjo-daro, now a famous UNESCO World Heritage site. Securing of these projects by Ecochard raised concerns within the UN headquarters in New York on the ethical implications of UN consultants using their "mission" assignments as platforms for expanding their private practices. The concerns, however, were dismissed by Weissman when he argued that Ecochard's prolonged stay in Pakistan, though private in nature, was still providing consultancy service for Pakistan's development program.

15. See Monique Eleb, "An Alternative to Functionalist Universalism: Écochard, Candilis, and ATBAT-Afrique," in *Anxious Modernisms*, edited by Sarah Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). Eleb sees the dual emphasis on "culture" and density in Atbat's work as a sign of a "schizophrenic" colonial approach to social reform that was unable to resolve the dichotomous demands of tradition and modernity.

What is ignored in this argument is the consideration that colonialism always operates in a schizophrenic manner. Framing modernization as a problem of setting in "balance" the vectors of "tradition" and "modernity" reasserts the authority of the colonial government as an inclusive power and the ultimate custodian of multicultural change. The schizophrenic approach betrayed by late French imperialism in Morocco was particularly pertinent in responding to the emerging national movement and was a critical aspect of French *associanism*, the correlate of British "indirect" rule in central Africa rule that constructed a system of native authority armed with oppressive powers in the name of cultural preservation. For the British policy of "decentralized despotism" in Africa, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). In a similar vein as Eleb, Nathalie de Mazières has also described "contradictory" tendencies in colonial governance as a shortcoming rather than a mode of power itself. See Nathalie de Mazières, "Homage," *Environmental Design: Journal of the Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre* 1 (1985): 22–25.

16. Landhi, the area east of Karachi, was chosen by the government as the site for refugee colonies as a favor to industrialist interests, such as the Dhada Bhoy family, that wanted easy labor access for their factories in the area. In this context, turning political questions into problems of administration formed the very basis of the government of civil bureaucrats.

17. Surely the scheme is also presented as an example of the social and climatic advances brought about by modernist planning practices (open green spaces promoting health and exercise, allowing prevailing wind to enter the houses, etc.). Instead of criticizing these claims, I have chosen to highlight the particular model of administration embodied in the design that is often ignored in the assessments of architectural modernism.

18. After graduating from Ecole des Beaux-Arts, under a curriculum that privileged the primacy of archeological knowledge, Ecochard's first job was in the Public Works department in Damascus. Although he began as a draftsman, he quickly moved on to work with prominent colonial archeologists on the restoration of important historical buildings, from the temple of Bel in Palmyra to the mosque of Bosrah. These restoration and planning projects launched Ecochard's career as an architect and planner in the Middle East. His next project was the restoration of the Azem Palace in Damascus, a prominent project that led to a series of private commissions in the city, leading to the commission for preparing the master plan for Damascus itself.

19. Quoted in de Mazières, "Homage," 22.

20. See Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

21. Constantine Doxiadis, "Progress Report on Korangi, 1959," Ford Foundation Archives, New York.

22. Doxiadis's undated letter to Ford Foundation, Karachi, "Observation on two report-proposals to strengthen western policy toward developing areas," Ford Foundation Archives, New York.

23. Doxiadis learned this point from a previous UN mission report on Pakistan by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger, "A Housing Program for Pakistan with Special Reference to Refugee Rehabilitation, prepared for the Government of Pakistan by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger," September 14, 1957, United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, New York.

24. From this perspective Greece was the new center of this transitory world. Doxiadis argued that as a developing country, Greece not only was experiencing the current historical transition, but because of its particular geographical location, Greece had the added historical experience of always having been in transition between opposing cultural forces of East and West.

25. After years of political contestations, the Ayub government handed over rule to the interim military government of Yahya Khan in 1969. The following election in 1970 resulted in conflicting claims to power. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, previously Ayub's foreign minister and now the leader of the opposition party Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), claimed victory in Western Pakistan, and Mujib-ur-Rahman, leader of the Awami League, claimed power in East Pakistan. The ensuing contestation between Bhutto and Mujib resulted in the continuation of military rule. This in turn led to popular unrest in East Pakistan. Attempts at suppression led to Indian involvement and a war between Pakistan and India. The war ended with East Pakistan claiming independence as Bangladesh in 1971 and Bhutto coming to power in West Pakistan.

26. The Bhutto government's initial socialist policies were greatly feared by the United States as a turn toward the Soviet Union. Bhutto's suppression of opposition and increasingly authoritative measures created a window for a military coup that brought General Zia-ul-Haq to power for the next eleven years. Zia's regime was strongly supported by the United States during the proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. Bhutto was executed by Zia's regime in 1979 on charges of masterminding the murder of an opposition leader.

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